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Public Argument as Self-Preservation: A 
Critique of Argumentation Theory as a 
Democratic Practice 
Kristen E. Hoerl, University o/Texas at Austin 
In his keynote address at the 1995 Ontario Society for the Study of 
Argumentation, Frans van Eemeren stated that because "argumentative 
discussion is the main tool for managing democratic processes," argumentation 
should be "valued as the elixir of life of participatory democracy" (Hicks and 
Langsdorf, 1999, p. 139). Insofar as van Eemeren conceived democracy as a 
process that involves widespread participation in the management of civic 
affairs, he suggested that the study of argumentation is a public good. Although 
I also seek to advance the goals of participatory democracy, I urge scholars to 
reconsider the role of argumentation theory in civic life. Several concepts 
prevalent within argumentation scholarship invoke norms foundational to the 
goals of participatory democracy, but they do not always characterize the 
deliberation that emerges in response to public controversy. Specifically, several 
instances of public controversy covered by news media do not exemplify self-
risking argument in which people reason collaboratively ahout issues of 
co=on concern. lhis paper explores two instances of public controversy that 
emerged in the aftermath of the attacks against the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon on September 11 , 200 I, and concludes by advocating an agenda for 
argumentation scholarship that might provide further understanding of the praxis 
of contemporary arguments and promote egalitarian forms of deliberation for 
actually existing publics. 
Self-Risk as the Condition for Democratic Argument 
Models of democratic deliberation have sought to equalize power 
relationships that structure argumentative practice hy calling for self-risking 
argument. Self-risking argument is characterized by mutual engagement, respect 
for all persons, and the ability to transform one's own perspective by 
considering the perspectives of interlocutors. (See Natanson, 1965; Ebninger, 
1970, Goodnight, 1993 ; and Foss & Griffin, 1995.) Goodnight (1993) advocates 
a "responsible rhetoric" that can only be achieved "if there is enough confidence 
for at least two parties to take the risk of being wrong when acting together" and 
when "a mutual respect. . . emerges from the co=unicative relationship between 
interlocutors" (pp. 338-339). Such characteristics distinguish ethical argument 
from oppressive forms of co=unication in which people preserve their selves 
and their perspectives. By allowing for the possibility that one's own perspective 
may change through the process of bilateral co=unication, self-risking 
argument ostensibly equalizes the power relations between arguers and those 
they seek to influence. Thus, the concept of self-risk is central to notions of 
public argument as a democratic practice. 
Public Controversy in the News Media 
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Although the scholarship on self-risk provides a useful framework for 
thinking about the norms that constitute democratic deliberation, several 
instances of public deliberation illustrate the limitations of self-risk for 
understanding public controversy. This paper focuses on two instances of 
deliberation that emerged in news media in the wake of the tragedies on 
September 11, 2001. The first controversy appeared in the editorial pages of the 
Houston Chronicle between September 14,2001 , and January 20, 2002. The 
second controversy appeared in national broadcast news coverage of statements 
made on the television talk show, "Politically Incorrect" on September 17,2001. 
Although this paper examines news media as a site of public 
controversy, it does not suggest that news media are necessarily representative 
of the public. Habermas (1962) described how technical and marketplace 
models of public life have subsumed considerations of public concerns during 
the last half of the 20th century. His critique of the economic imperatives driving 
the production of mass media highlighted the commercial function of the mass 
media; thus, he suggested that we must be careful about attributing public 
concerns with the news media; indeed, news media may be interested in a much 
narrower audience.! 
In order to avoid collapsing the public with news media, this paper 
draws a distinction between public controversy and the public sphere. Most 
people living in late-capitalist democracies learn most, ifnot all of their 
information about public policy issues from the commercial news media even 
though a limited range of voices may gain a hearing within such media. As they 
represent clashes of interest regarding these issues, commercial news media 
become a site for identifying public controversy. Thus, the extent to which news 
mediated controversies reflect characteristics of self-risking argument may 
indicate the scope of democracy's presence in our lives. 
Self-Preservation: Public Controversy in the Wake of September 11 
On September 11, 2001 , and for months thereafter, news media 
coverage put the attacks on the World Trade Center on the public agenda. Three 
days after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the Houston 
Chronicle published an editorial written by Robert Jensen, a journalism 
professor at The University of Texas at Austin. Jensen (200 I) implicated the 
role of United States' foreign policy in the attacks on September II and argued 
that the attacks were no more reprehensible than atrocities committed by the 
United States against countries in Central America, the Middle-East, and Asia (p. 
A27). This argument provoked widespread outcry. Editor of the Houston 
Chronicle David Langworthy (2002) told readers that his office received letters 
suggesting "virtual unanimity in opposition to Jensen' s comparison of past U.S. 
government actions with those of the 9-11 terrorists" (p. I) . Although 
Langworthy indicated that many people challenged Jensen's ideas, most of the 
letters printed in the Houston Chronicle that objected to Jensen's article did not 
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respond to Jensen's argument; instead, controversy emerged over whether 
Jensen should have presented his argument in a public forum at all. 
One letter to the editor ofthe Houston Chronicle claimed that Jensen's 
"extreme views should not be printed" while "the nation" mourned the attacks of 
September II (Swinney, 2001 , p. A39). On September 19, Larry Faulkner, 
President of The University of Texas at Austin, also wrote a letter to the 
Houston Chronicle in response to Jensen's editorial. Even though he personally 
disagreed with Jensen' s argument, Faulkner suggested that the public ought to 
respect Jensen's right to express his opinion because Jensen spoke "under the 
protection of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution" (p. A39). Faulkner 
then told readers that Jensen had become "a fountain of undiluted foolishness on 
issues of public policy" and instructed students to become "skilled at 
recognizing and discounting" arguments similar to Jensen's (2001 , p. A39). 
Faulkner's condemnation of Jensen repudiated the ideals of mutual 
consideration of the interlocutors' perspective and of respect for alternative 
viewpoints. By urging students to eschew Jensen's argument, Faulker also 
indicated that self-risk should not be the norm for public argument; nor should it 
be a norm within higher education. Thus, his comments suggested that the ideal 
of free speech does not necessarily promote mutual understanding and common 
ground necessary for democratic deliberation. 
The day before Faulkner's response to Jensen appeared in the Houston 
Chronicle, a similar controversy emerged following Bill Maher's comments 
during his late-night talk show program, "Politically Incorrecf '. On September 
17, 2001 , Maher objected to President Bush's statement that the terrorists who 
flew planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon demonstrated 
cowardice. Maher told audiences, " Staying in the airplane when it hits the 
building -- say what you want about it, it ' s not cowardly." Maher then added 
that the United States ' military strategies, such as " lobbing cruise missiles from 
2,000 miles away" did represent cowardice. 
Maher's comments generated irate responses from public figures and 
corporate sponsors for ABC. On September 20, hosts of the national television 
morning news program The Early Show discussed Maher' s comments. Bryant 
Gumbel (Gumbel & Clayson, 2001) concluded that Maher must not have meant 
for his comments to sound as provocative as they had been received. "About 
every individual who sits in--in this kind of position. You're always afraid that 
you are going to say something that you really didn' t mean." Gumbel's 
suggestion that Maher' s offensive statements were not intentional indicated that 
he thought the argument was, indeed, offensive and not worthy of consideration. 
Thus, Gumbel did not risk the possibility that Maher might have a legitimate 
argument. 
Other news anchors did not attempt to find any justification for 
Maher' s comments. During her discussion with Gumbel, Jane Clayson remarked, 
"Open mouth, insert large feet." Mark McEwen, the program' s meteorologist, 
then spoke to an imagined Maher: "keep your big mouth shut." Clayson and 
McEwen then congratulated Sears and Federal Express for pulling their 
advertising from ABC following Maher's commentary. Clayson's and 
McEwen's support for Sears' and Federal Express' withdrawal of financial 
support for ABC indicated that the public should not only disregard Maher's 
provocative comments but should revoke his nationwide platform to express his 
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ideas. Instead of discrediting Maher's arguments on the basis of his reasoning, 
Clayson and McEwen suggested that Maher shouldn't speak at all . 
The individuals who objected to Jensen and Maher presumed that their 
own responses did constitute reasonable discourse, whereas Jensen and Maher 
exemplified incorrigible speech. Thus, these individuals suggested that they did 
not need to consider perspectives that challenged prevailing attitudes about 
United States' foreign policy. These brief case studies indicate that self-risk is 
not a prevailing norm in deliberation about public policies within news media 
coverage. Although journalistic norms include the presentation of multiple 
points of view, critics of Jensen and Maher suggested that the public may not be 
engaged in consideration of multiple points of view; nor do these individuals 
express respect for their interlocutors. Furthermore, comments espousing 
individuals' removal from public consideration suggest that the norm of 
presenting multiple perspectives is in eclipse. Instead of representing self-risking 
argument, these examples characterized public controversy as a self-preserving 
exercise. 
Critical Argumentation, an Exploration of Self-Preserving Discourse 
Although self-risk does not necessarily describe public argument, my 
use of this concept to evaluate public controversies following September II 
suggests that the concept of self-risk in argumentation scholarship should not be 
abandoned altogether. Like notion of the public sphere, self-risk may be best 
regarded as a "normative, yet counter-factual ideal" (Fraser, 1997, p. 71). As a 
set of ideal conditions for enabling democratic deliberation, the concept may be 
a useful critical tool for assessing public controversies . The notion of self-risk in 
argument establishes an ideal to consider the possibilities of and the constraints 
that limit participatory democracy in contemporary societies. 
Alternatively, scholarship interested in an ethical ideal cannot rest with 
identifying argument's absences; it must also explore the constraints that limit 
public deliberation. To understand why arguers preserve their initial 
perspectives during their engagement in public controversy, we need to 
determine what factors constrain the possibilities of self-risking argument in 
moments when the rights to express one' s opinion is held as a public good. 
A further examination of the contexts surrounding public controversy 
in the wake of September 11 indicates that perceptions of the differential status 
of interlocutors motivated self-preservation as an argumentative strategy during 
public controversy. Several letters to the editor of the Houston Chronicle 
suggested that they valued Faulkner' s input because his identity was 
consubstantial with the University. Frank Miller (2000) stated, "My anger at the 
printing of Robert Jensen's Outlook article was soothed somewhat by the 
president of the University of Texas' gratifying response. I hope Jensen is 
removed from his position of inflicting his views on his captive audience" (p. 
A35). Miller drew attention to the positions of power that structure relationships 
within the university and suggested that Faulkner's repudiation of Jensen was 
significant because Faulkner held a position of authority over Jensen. 
Miller also indicated that Faulkner's authority was important because 
Jensen also held a powerful position at the University. The idea that students are 
"held captive" by their professors implied that students' thoughts are determined 
by their professors' position. Miller's appeal to Faulkner to terminate Jensen's 
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job, as well as Miller's concern for coercive argument in higher education, 
emphasized how relations of status and hierarchy may constrain what may be 
said within the institutions in which individuals live and work. Thus, he 
indicated that individuals engage in self-preserving arguments when the status of 
interlocutors looms preeminently in the context of their deliberation. As Miller 
suggested, self-risk is not a part of public argument when interlocutors perceive 
a world in which unilateral influence predominates. Instead, interlocutors protect 
themselves against the arguments that challenge their notions of "common 
sense." 
Sears and Federal Express' responses to B ill Maher's comments 
indicated why considerations of power constrain self-risk in public argument. 
By pulling their ads from ABC, Sears and Federal Express demonstrated that 
they did not think Maher's commentary provided a suitable climate for 
consumers. Predictably, the network cancelled Maher's program the following 
summer. Sears ' and Federal Express ' decision to drop their accounts with ABC 
highlighted the economic imperatives of the commercial broadcast media. Their 
decision suggested that the financial imperatives of the institutions that people 
live and work within constrain how people may deliberate with one another. 
President Faulkner also faced institutional pressure that delimited what 
he could say in response to Jensen' s editorial. Raising money from private 
donors and alumni is one of Faulkner's primary responsibilities. This role has 
become increasingly important as state legislatures have constricted fimding for 
public universities while student enrollments have grown during the past 
(Hanley, 1996, p. 67). The imperative for Faulkner to maintain a favorable 
relationship with university sponsors provides a plausible explanation for the 
self-preservation he employed in response to Jensen's editorial. Given 
Houston's proximity to Austin, many Houston Chronicle readers are likely to be 
alumni, donors, or parents of students attending the university. By printing his 
response in Houston's local newspaper, Faulkner directed his response to a 
constituency who may have objected to Jensen's critique of United States' 
foreign policy. Faulkner was not interested in engaging an audience sympathetic 
with Jensen; instead, he sought to assuage Houston Chronicle readers who found 
Jensen's critique appalling. He did not encourage them to consider the merits of 
Jensen's argument because he sought to maintain their financial support. 
Public deliberation over Jensen's and Maher's critique of United 
States' foreign policy elucidated the constraints on self-risk within public 
argument. Faulkner did not engage in self-risk following Jensen's editorial 
because he spoke for the university in a role that required him to raise fimds 
from wealthy donors. Likewise, the hosts of The Early Show and ABC's 
executive producers had to maintain a climate amenable to corporate sponsors. 
Thus, they could not engage in controversial ideas that might offend potential 
consumers. These case studies indicate that an arguer's role within prevaiJing 
institutions has implications for his or her ability to foster open deliberation, 
even within those organizations of higher education and journalism that promote 
free speech as a hallmark of a democratic society. 
Public Argument: An Oxymoron? 
Institutional constraints placed upon arguers suggest that arguers are 
less likely to engage in self-risk when the stakes of such risk include more than 
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just one's perception of truth or justice; people are less likely to risk the 
possibility that their assumptions may be wrong when doing so has implications 
for their livelihoods and for the financial support necessary for the maintenance 
of the institutions that they represent. The preceding case studies also indicate 
that individuals are more likely to engage in self-preserving forms of argument 
when institutional goals are at stake. Indeed, it appears that an arguer's 
institutional affiliation often provides the exigency for engaging public 
controversy; therefore, the goals of the institution determine what they may say. 
Individuals who represent not only themselves, but the institutions that 
legitirrllze them as authoritative spokespersons, cannot risk the institution' s 
identity because institutions do not have the flexibility that individuals have. 
The constraints to self-risk in public controversy have implications for 
how we think about publics and publicity. Several critics of Jensen and Maher 
suggested that the ideal of open deliberation is a mirage; despite references to 
free speech as an inherent public good, these people preserved their perspectives 
and highlighted the role that power plays in the decision-making process. 
Arguments meeting the conditions for deliberative democracy also failed to 
materialize in public discourse because interlocutors didn' t necessarily engage 
in public controversy for public purposes. My analysis of President Faulkner's 
response to Professor Jensen's editorial suggests that many people access 
channels of public argument, such as co=ercial news media., to reach a much 
narrower audience. It also indicates that representatives oflarger institutions 
seek a hearing from publicly accessible channels for private, or institutional 
goals. Thus, the consequences of argument for broader publics may not be of 
central concern for arguers engaged in public controversy. 
These observations indicate that scholarship theorizing self-risk and 
co=on ground does not adequately explain what happens when people engage 
in public controversy. Argumentation scholars interested in the possibilities and 
limitations of deliberative democracy need to tum their attention away from 
ideal methods of democratic argument to understand the praxis of prevailing 
arguments about public issues. More importantly, scholarship should begin to 
develop theories that explain why argument fails to represent the ideals of 
deliberative democracy. Put differently, scholars need to explore the conditions 
that sustain contemporary methods of argument and attend to issues that shape 
contemporary argument, such as audiences and interests that extract concerns 
about the public good from public controversies. As scholars interested in 
promoting deliberative democracy, we need to acknowledge the factors that 
constrain self-risk so that we may begin theorizing what we might do to 
overcome them. Through such scholarship, we may also provide our students 
with useful analytics for engaging their social worlds, not only as professionals, 
but as public citizens. 
Note 
'Additional scholarship explaining bow marketplace models of public life have proliferated with the 
commercialization of the mass media may be found in Oscar H. Gandy, 'Dividing Practices: 
Segmentation and Targeting in the Emerging Public Sphere," in Mediated Politics: Communication 
in the Future of Democracy. ed. W. Lance Bennett & Robert Entman (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 141-159; and Robert McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: 
Communication PolitiCS in Dubious Times (New York: The New Press, 1999). 
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